Why Britain is allowing China’s new ‘super embassy’ in London

Planning permission is to be granted finally for China’s new “super embassy” in London’s former Royal Mint building, according to reports. It has been a protracted saga, spiced up with superpower rivalries and claims of spying. The long-running controversy is only one example of Britain’s ambiguous relationship with the resurgent Middle Kingdom.

Maybe a certain amount of pride, seeing such a symbol of historic British financial power slipping away into foreign hands, especially one that many regard as hostile and malign.

Most specifically, given its proximity to the financial districts, law courts and parliament, there have been concerns that the bowels of the building could be used for intercepting communications cables. Heritage and security concerns have thus held it up for some years.

The proposed site is some 20,000 square metres and set the People’s Republic back £255m on acquisition in 2018. It will be the largest embassy of any kind in Europe.

Given that the Chinese are similarly threatening to block the refurbishment of the British embassy in Beijing, a quid pro quo feels inevitable.

Yes, but that’s to be expected. MI5 is said to be “very relaxed” about the danger to communications and has ordered unspecified mitigations to reduce any danger. The truth is that the embassy is, in the modern age, quite open to surveillance by the British, and the Chinese can gather intelligence via a range of means. Only this week, two bogus Chinese headhunters were identified on LinkedIn; the recent aborted prosecution of two men accused of helping China gather intelligence, and concerns raised by the speaker of the Commons, highlight how blatant Chinese activities can be.

Yes, but nobody in authority is willing to declare this to be the case. This definitional conundrum caused the recent spying case to collapse, and the issue remains vexed.

Officially, China is an “epoch-defining and systemic challenge” rather than a threat, which you may think amounts to the same thing. Britain needs to trade with China and attract investment, especially post-Brexit, but concerns have grown about national security implications – resulting in the vetting of Huawei’s role in 5G upgrades and Chinese involvement in civil nuclear programmes.

Not long ago, Richard Dearlove, the former head of MI6, said Beijing could bring Britain to a standstill by bringing vital national infrastructure such as hospitals, energy grids, and transport networks “under the control of the Chinese Communist Party”. Britain, like the United States, would also prefer it if Xi Jinping weren’t quite so supportive of Vladimir Putin.

It is a long list of grievances, albeit mostly on the British side (the Chinese are a bit too big to fret about these former imperialists on the other side of the world). Concerns include: human rights, especially in Hong Kong and for Uighur Muslims; territorial expansion in east Asia, including aggression towards the likes of Vietnam and the Philippines; financial and military support for Russia in the Ukraine war; unfair trading practices; cyber attacks; weak net zero commitments; the sanctioning of British parliamentarians; and incessant spying on politicians and businesses, especially in the defence sector.

The UK market for goods such as smartphones and electric vehicles has become relatively more important since Donald Trump launched his trade war with China.

Keir Starmer is leading a mission to Beijing in the new year to improve relations, following a similar exercise by Rachel Reeves as part of the UK-China Economic and Financial Dialogue. Science minister, Liz Kendall, says: “National security will always come first. That is absolutely non-negotiable. But where we can safely work with China, whether that’s on the economy or areas like research, that’s what we’ll do.”

Mooncakeism, you might call that.